AutismologyAutistic studiesAutism and ASD: Current State of Knowledge and Main Theories Under Discussion
A — Documentary state of knowledge
Detailed preservation of the V1.2 documentary review, with corrected terminology
A.1 — Clinical framework, spectrum, heterogeneity, genetics and aetiological categories
A.1.1 — How clinical classifications currently define ASD
In the World Health Organization’s ICD-11, the diagnostic category corresponding to autism spectrum disorders is classified among neurodevelopmental disorders. The diagnostic requirements mainly concern persistent differences in the capacity to initiate and sustain reciprocal social interaction and communication, together with restricted, repetitive and inflexible patterns of behaviour, interests or activities. ICD-11 also distinguishes presentations according to intellectual development and functional language.
Source: World Health Organization. Clinical descriptions and diagnostic requirements for ICD-11 mental, behavioural and neurodevelopmental disorders (CDDR). 2024. ISBN 978-92-4-007726-3.
DSM-5-TR likewise uses a single category of “autism spectrum disorder”, with specifiers rather than the former separate categories such as Asperger syndrome, autistic disorder, and so on.
It is important to understand what this means and what it does not mean.
It means that, in clinical practice, diagnosis is based on a set of developmental and behavioural characteristics assessed in context.
It does not mean that there is a lesion, a single brain abnormality, a molecule, a gene or a biological test whose presence would be sufficient to establish the diagnosis.
The diagnosis of ASD therefore remains essentially clinical and developmental. Research on biomarkers is extensive, but no single biological measure is currently specific, sensitive, validated and reproducible enough to replace clinical assessment. Recent work examines brain imaging, EEG, eye tracking, genetics, transcriptomic, proteomic, metabolomic and immune profiles, the microbiome and various digital signatures, but these avenues remain at very different levels of validation.
Sources: Understanding autism: Causes, diagnosis, and advancing therapies. 2025. PMID 40449388. ; Wang BM et al. Presymptomatic Biological, Structural, and Functional Diagnostic Biomarkers of Autism Spectrum Disorder. J Neurochem. 2025. PMID 40390287. ; Early autism detection: a review of emerging technologies, biomarkers, and explainable AI approaches. 2025/2026. PMID 41449406.
This distinction is important: “classified as neurodevelopmental” is not equivalent to “diagnosed neurologically”.
Sources: Understanding autism: Causes, diagnosis, and advancing therapies. 2025. PMID 40449388. ; Wang BM et al. Presymptomatic Biological, Structural, and Functional Diagnostic Biomarkers of Autism Spectrum Disorder. J Neurochem. 2025. PMID 40390287. ; Early autism detection: a review of emerging technologies, biomarkers, and explainable AI approaches. 2025/2026. PMID 41449406.
A.1.2 — The word “spectrum”: what it means and what it does not mean
The word “spectrum” is often understood as though there were a single line running from “a little autistic” to “very autistic”. That is not a good representation of current clinical usage.
The spectrum is multidimensional. Two people can both meet the diagnostic criteria while differing greatly in language, measured intelligence, autonomy, sensory characteristics, interests, communication, adaptive abilities, associated disorders, physical health, developmental trajectory and support needs.
This great heterogeneity among populations grouped under the diagnosis of ASD is now one of the central problems in research. It complicates the search for common mechanisms and can produce contradictory results when studies use very different groups while bringing them together under the same diagnostic label.
A major part of current debate concerns precisely the following question: are the phenomena and populations currently grouped under the diagnosis of ASD better understood as a continuous dimension of traits distributed through the population, as an identifiable category, as several subgroups, or as a set of different trajectories partly converging on the same behavioural diagnosis? There is no single unanimously accepted answer.
A.1.3 — Heterogeneity: a major fact, but with several possible meanings
The word heterogeneity covers at least four different realities.
First, phenotypic heterogeneity: observable manifestations differ greatly from one person to another.
Second, developmental heterogeneity: trajectories can differ. In some children, characteristics are identified very early; in others, they become evident later; some show regression in certain abilities, while others do not.
Third, aetiological heterogeneity: several combinations of genetic, biological and developmental factors may be associated with autistic presentations.
Fourth, heterogeneity of associated conditions: intellectual disability, epilepsy, sleep disorders, motor disorders, language disorders, anxiety, ADHD and other characteristics can coexist with autism but are not present in everyone.
It is therefore risky to take a characteristic observed in one subgroup and turn it into a definition of autism as a whole.
A.1.4 — Genetics: what is well established
In populations defined by ASD diagnostic criteria, family, twin and genomic studies show a substantial genetic contribution to variation associated with the diagnosis. Contemporary reviews often report heritability estimates in the range of 70–90%, depending on methods, phenotype definitions and the populations studied.
Source: Genovese A, Butler MG. Genetic contributions to autism spectrum disorder. Psychol Med. 2020/2021. PMID 33634770.
However, “strongly genetic” does not mean “determined by a single gene”.
The genetic architecture associated with ASD diagnoses is extraordinarily complex. It includes:
- very many common variants, each with a very small individual effect, whose effects partly add together as a polygenic contribution to the statistical probability of receiving an ASD diagnosis;
- rare variants that may have a larger effect;
- de novo mutations, meaning mutations arising in the child without being detected in the parents;
- copy-number variations affecting chromosomal segments;
- chromosomal abnormalities;
- monogenic variants in some situations;
- combinations of rare variants and a polygenic contribution to the statistical probability of receiving an ASD diagnosis.
Sources: Genovese A, Butler MG. Genetic contributions to autism spectrum disorder. Psychol Med. 2020/2021. PMID 33634770. ; Trost B et al. The contributions of rare inherited and polygenic risk to ASD in multiplex families. 2023. PMID 37506195. ; Molecular and Genetic Mechanisms in Autism Spectrum Disorder. Ann Neurol. 2025. PMID 40801227.
More than a hundred genes associated in the genetic literature with a higher probability of an ASD diagnosis have been strongly implicated through rare variants, and the number varies with criteria and the progress of studies. But most of the statistical variation in the probability of an ASD diagnosis at population level does not come from a few rare mutations: inherited common variants also play a considerable role.
Sources: Genovese A, Butler MG. Genetic contributions to autism spectrum disorder. Psychol Med. 2020/2021. PMID 33634770. ; Trost B et al. The contributions of rare inherited and polygenic risk to ASD in multiplex families. 2023. PMID 37506195. ; Molecular and Genetic Mechanisms in Autism Spectrum Disorder. Ann Neurol. 2025. PMID 40801227.
There is therefore no single “autism gene”.
The same genetic variant may also be associated with very different outcomes across individuals: ASD diagnosis, intellectual disability, epilepsy, language disorder, a mild phenotype, or even no major clinical manifestation. This is the problem of incomplete penetrance and variable expressivity.
Conversely, two people with fairly similar autistic presentations may have very different genetic architectures.
A.1.5 — “Biological”, “genetic”, “neurological” and “biomarker” are not synonyms
This distinction is fundamental when reading articles.
“Genetic” concerns DNA, genetic variants and their transmission or occurrence.
“Biological” is much broader: it can include genetics, cellular development, gene expression, physiology, immunity, metabolism, the nervous system, and so on.
“Neurological” specifically concerns the nervous system.
A “biomarker” is a biological measure that may be associated with a state or may help to detect, predict or monitor it.
A phenomenon can have genetic or biological bases without there being a single diagnostic biomarker. Likewise, the existence of average brain differences between groups does not mean that one can examine the brain of an individual person and reliably determine whether that person is autistic.
The neurophysiological meta-analysis published in 2026 illustrates this point well: across 145 EEG/MEG studies and more than 7,000 participants, some sensory-response latencies differed on average between autistic and non-autistic groups, but effects were generally modest, heterogeneity was substantial, and clinical application as a biomarker remained limited.
Source: Ghosh A et al. Neurophysiological alterations during sensory processing in autism — a meta-analysis. Eur Child Adolesc Psychiatry. 2026;35:767–784. DOI 10.1007/s00787-025-02917-0.
A.1.6 — “Syndromic autism”: terminology used in part of the literature
The term “syndromic autism” belongs mainly to clinical genetics and developmental neurology. It generally refers to an autistic presentation occurring in the context of an identifiable genetic, chromosomal or molecular syndrome that also includes other characteristics.
Frequently cited examples include fragile X syndrome, tuberous sclerosis complex, certain chromosomal variations, some microdeletions or microduplications, and several monogenic syndromes.
Sources: Fernandez BA, Scherer SW. Syndromic autism spectrum disorders: moving from a clinically defined to a molecularly defined approach. Dialogues Clin Neurosci. 2017/2018. PMID 29398931. ; Moss J, Howlin P. Autism spectrum disorders in genetic syndromes: implications for diagnosis, intervention and understanding the wider ASD population. J Intellect Disabil Res. 2009. PMID 19708861. ; Heterogeneity of Autism Characteristics in Genetic Syndromes: Key Considerations for Assessment and Support. 2023. PMID 37193200.
Historically, a syndrome was first recognised through a clinical constellation — distinctive morphology, involvement of several organs, developmental profile, and so on — and then confirmed by targeted testing. Modern sequencing techniques have introduced a second situation: some people have a pathogenic molecular variant discovered through genomic analysis even though the clinical presentation had not previously been recognised as a classic syndrome. One review therefore proposed distinguishing “clinically defined” from “molecularly defined” syndromes.
Source: Fernandez BA, Scherer SW. Syndromic autism spectrum disorders: moving from a clinically defined to a molecularly defined approach. Dialogues Clin Neurosci. 2017/2018. PMID 29398931.
The term “syndromic autism” is not itself a distinct ICD-11 diagnosis.
Sources: Moss J, Howlin P. Autism spectrum disorders in genetic syndromes: implications for diagnosis, intervention and understanding the wider ASD population. J Intellect Disabil Res. 2009. PMID 19708861. ; Heterogeneity of Autism Characteristics in Genetic Syndromes: Key Considerations for Assessment and Support. 2023. PMID 37193200.
A.1.7 — “Non-syndromic autism”: terminology used in part of the literature
“Non-syndromic” generally means that no identifiable overall syndrome has been recognised.
Above all, it does not mean:
- absence of genetics;
- absence of biology;
- absence of familial factors;
- “pure” autism in a philosophical sense;
- a homogeneous category.
The non-syndromic group probably itself contains many different genetic and developmental architectures.
The boundary between syndromic and non-syndromic autism also shifts as genetic analyses improve. A person once described as “idiopathic” may later receive a more precise genetic explanation.
A.1.8 — “Idiopathic”, “primary” and “secondary”
The term “idiopathic” essentially means that no specific identified cause is available.
In some texts, the expression “primary autism” is used in a similar way to designate a presentation meeting ASD criteria that, within those authors’ framework, is not explained by another identified condition.
The expression “secondary autism” is used in some work when a presentation meeting ASD criteria occurs in the context of a condition or factor regarded as aetiologically relevant: a genetic syndrome, metabolic disease, neurological injury, or another situation of that kind.
Source: Casanova MF et al. Editorial: Secondary vs. Idiopathic Autism. Front Psychiatry. 2020. PMID 32346372.
These terms are not perfectly standardised and can be confusing.
The main problem with the word “secondary” is that it can suggest a simple causal chain: “disease X → autism”. In reality, mechanisms may be much more complex. In some genetic syndromes, behaviours meeting some ASD criteria are observed, but the profile may differ qualitatively from that of populations described in some studies as “non-syndromic”. The effects of intellectual disability, language, epilepsy or the syndrome-specific phenotype then need to be distinguished. [R10-R11, R13]
A.1.9 — “Essential autism” and “complex autism”
In the early 2000s, Judith Miles and colleagues proposed a distinction between “essential autism” and “complex autism”.
In their definition, the “complex” group showed evidence of early abnormalities in morphogenesis, in particular significant dysmorphology and/or microcephaly. The remainder were classified as “essential”. The initial study reported differences in prognosis, epilepsy, MRI findings and familial recurrence.
Source: Miles JH et al. Essential versus complex autism: definition of fundamental prognostic subtypes. Am J Med Genet A. 2005. PMID 15887228.
This classification did not become the general diagnostic system for autism.
Later studies replicated some differences but also showed the limitations of the dysmorphology tool and its dependence on the populations studied.
Source: Identification of Essential, Equivocal and Complex Autism by the Autism Dysmorphology Measure: An Observational Study. 2020. PMID 32767173.
It should therefore be regarded as a historical attempt at subtyping rather than a universally accepted division.
A.1.10 — A difficult question: can different trajectories converge on the same ASD diagnostic category?
At the level of current diagnosis, several different trajectories can result in presentations meeting the same criteria.
The criteria are phenotypic: they describe developmental and behavioural characteristics. Several biological pathways can therefore lead to behaviours that meet the same criteria.
This creates a classic problem in medicine and psychiatry: a clinical category can be useful without corresponding to a single cause.
This is one reason why some researchers want to stratify cohorts further: by genetic aetiology, intellectual development, language, trajectory, perceptual characteristics, comorbidities, and so on.
But this stratification creates a problem of its own: the more finely the category is divided, the greater the risk of losing any common mechanisms that may exist.
A.2 — Laurent Mottron, perception and prototypical models
A.2.1 — Laurent Mottron: general place in autism research
Laurent Mottron is a professor and researcher in autism psychiatry and cognition in Montreal. A substantial part of his work has consisted in challenging exclusively deficit-based interpretations of autistic functioning and studying perceptual, cognitive and developmental characteristics as forms of organisation that may include enhanced performance.
His work does not constitute “the official theory of autism”. It occupies an important but specific place within a field in which many models coexist.
Several periods or lines of work can be distinguished:
- Enhanced Perceptual Functioning;
- autistic intelligence and reasoning;
- savant abilities and veridical mapping;
- learning through structures;
- criticism of spectrum heterogeneity;
- prototypical autism;
- asymmetric developmental bifurcations.
A.2.2 — Enhanced Perceptual Functioning: the EPF model
The “Enhanced Perceptual Functioning” (EPF) model, set out notably in the 2006 synthesis by Mottron, Dawson, Soulières, Hubert and Burack, partly reverses models that explained autistic perception mainly through a deficit in global processing.
Source: Mottron L, Dawson M, Soulières I, Hubert B, Burack J. Enhanced perceptual functioning in autism: an update, and eight principles of autistic perception. J Autism Dev Disord. 2006;36:27–43. PMID 16453071. DOI 10.1007/s10803-005-0040-7.
It proposes several principles, including:
- a local orientation more often available by default;
- enhanced discrimination for some simple visual or auditory stimuli;
- greater autonomy of perceptual operations from higher-level processing;
- a larger contribution of perception to some cognitive tasks regarded as complex;
- greater recruitment of perceptual regions in some tasks.
It should be noted that “local” does not automatically mean “incapable of global processing”. An important idea in the model is that local perceptual processing may be preferred or more autonomous without global processing necessarily being absent.
A 2012 functional-imaging meta-analysis found, across several visual tasks, greater recruitment of occipital, temporal and parietal regions in autistic participants and relatively less frontal recruitment. This result is compatible with a greater role for perceptual mechanisms in some tasks.
Source: Samson F, Mottron L, Soulières I, Zeffiro TA. Enhanced visual functioning in autism: an ALE meta-analysis. Hum Brain Mapp. 2012;33:1553–1581. PMID 21465627.
However, the perceptual literature is not uniform. For example, a meta-analysis of global motion found a small average disadvantage in some coherent- or biological-motion tasks.
Source: Van der Hallen R et al. Global Motion Perception in Autism Spectrum Disorder: A Meta-Analysis. 2019. PMID 31489542.
The reasonable conclusion is therefore not “autistic perception is superior”, but rather: some perceptual domains show reproducible differences, including advantages, disadvantages or different strategies depending on the task.
A.2.3 — Autistic intelligence and reasoning tests
Mottron, Michelle Dawson and colleagues have also studied the way intelligence tests assess autistic people.
In a well-known 2007 study, autistic participants obtained markedly higher scores on Raven’s Progressive Matrices than on Wechsler scales, particularly among some participants classified as having low intelligence by the Wechsler. The authors argued that instruments built around non-autistic profiles could underestimate some forms of autistic reasoning.
Source: Dawson M et al. The level and nature of autistic intelligence. Psychol Sci. 2007. (Raven/Wechsler study).
This study does not demonstrate that Raven represents “true intelligence” or that all autistic people are underestimated. It shows that profiles across tests can be atypical and that a global score should be interpreted cautiously.
A.2.4 — Savant abilities and “veridical mapping”
Mottron, Dawson and Soulières proposed that some exceptional abilities observed in autistic people may be linked to a greater role for perception and a strong capacity to detect structures.
Source: Mottron L, Dawson M, Soulières I. Enhanced perception in savant syndrome: patterns, structure and creativity. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B. 2009. PMID 19528021.
The concept of “veridical mapping”, developed more specifically in 2013, refers to the mapping of isomorphic structures: stable relationships between elements can be detected across different systems, for example between written symbols and sounds, musical pitches and note names, calendars and numerical regularities.
Source: Mottron L et al. Veridical mapping in the development of exceptional autistic abilities. Neurosci Biobehav Rev. 2013;37:209–228. PMID 23219745.
The model has been used to account for phenomena such as:
- hyperlexia;
- absolute pitch;
- calendar calculation;
- some savant talents;
- spontaneous learning based on structured regularities.
The theoretical interest lies in viewing these skills as positive consequences of detection and mapping mechanisms rather than as isolated curiosities.
However, veridical mapping does not automatically apply to every autistic person and has not been demonstrated to be a single mechanism of autism.
A.2.5 — Language and structured information in Mottron’s work
In more recent work, Mottron, Ostrolenk and Gagnon have proposed that some autistic children may develop components of language not only through social exposure to spoken language but also from highly structured information such as letters, numbers, songs, subtitles, grapheme-phoneme correspondences or other regular systems.
Source: Mottron L, Ostrolenk A, Gagnon D. In Prototypical Autism, the Genetic Ability to Learn Language Is Triggered by Structured Information, Not Only by Exposure to Oral Language. Genes. 2021;12:1112. DOI 10.3390/genes12081112.
This proposal is linked to observations of hyperlexia and atypical language trajectories.
It is a developmental model emphasising the existence of learning pathways that differ from the socially mediated trajectory usually described.
A.2.6 — Prototypical autism according to Mottron and Gagnon
In 2023, Mottron and Gagnon proposed a more radical reformulation: “prototypical autism”.
Source: Mottron L, Gagnon D. Prototypical autism: New diagnostic criteria and asymmetrical bifurcation model. Acta Psychol. 2023;237:103938. PMID 37187094.
Their starting point is that the progressive broadening of criteria has produced a highly heterogeneous “spectrum” category. They nevertheless argue that there is a particularly recognisable clinical presentation in early childhood, with qualitatively specific signs.
They propose that this prototypical autism corresponds to an asymmetric developmental bifurcation.
In their model, some central elements would be organised around a reduction in the usual social bias and increased investment in complex or structured non-social information.
The model differs from a simple theory of “severity”. Prototypical autism is not synonymous with “severe” autism.
It also differs from the idea of a single genetic cause. The authors argue that a category can be recognisable through its developmental configuration without having a single molecular aetiology.
This model is not incorporated into ICD-11 or DSM-5-TR. It is a controversial scientific proposal.
A.2.7 — “Frank autism”: can a prototype be recognised quickly?
Before and alongside Mottron’s work, researchers studied the notion of “frank autism”, meaning a very rapid clinical impression that a person presents an obvious autistic profile.
A survey of expert clinicians had shown that many reported forming this kind of impression quickly. But a rapid clinical impression can be vulnerable to confirmation bias, which means it must be tested and never substituted for a full assessment.
Source: De Marchena A, Miller J. ‘Frank’ presentations as a novel research construct and element of diagnostic decision-making in autism spectrum disorder. 2017. PMCID PMC5400744.
A study published in 2024 asked clinicians to form impressions after five minutes of observation. Their impressions were often consistent with the full diagnostic assessment and correlated with the severity scores used in that study, but sensitivity was insufficient: a substantial number of autistic people were not recognised as such in the first few minutes.
Source: Canale RR et al. Investigating frank autism: clinician initial impressions and autism characteristics. Mol Autism. 2024;15:48. PMID 39538274.
This result supports the existence of a subgroup whose presentation is very immediately recognisable, but it does not demonstrate that this subgroup alone constitutes “true autism”. It also shows why a clinical prototype can have good specificity but limited sensitivity.
A.2.8 — Critique of the continuum: “autism-ness does not exist, but autism does”
In 2025, Mottron, Lafrance McGuire and Gagnon published an explicit critique of the idea that autism is simply the extreme end of a quantitative continuum of traits distributed throughout the population.
Source: Mottron L, Lafrance McGuire O, Gagnon D. Autism-ness Does Not Exist, but Autism Does. Part 1. Autism & Developmental Language Impairments. 2025;10. PMID 41356733.
They propose distinguishing:
- isolated traits that may exist to varying degrees in many people;
- a qualitatively recognisable prototypical autistic configuration.
They describe prototypical autism as a quasi-categorical possibility that is stable in human development and evolution.
This position conflicts with a substantial part of contemporary dimensional research. It raises difficult questions:
- where to draw the boundary;
- how to address people whose presentation is less typical;
- how to avoid biases related to sex, gender, masking, age or intelligence;
- how to validate a prototype independently of expert intuition;
- how to avoid turning a heuristic tool into arbitrary diagnostic exclusion.
A.2.9 — The 2025 “asymmetric developmental bifurcations”
In September 2025, Mottron and several colleagues proposed a more general framework: “asymmetric developmental bifurcations”, or ADB.
Source: Mottron L et al. Asymmetric developmental bifurcations in polarized environments: a new class of human variants, which may include autism. Mol Psychiatry. 2025;30:6155–6164. PMID 41023420. DOI 10.1038/s41380-025-03275-8.
The model draws on dynamic systems in which the same system can end up in two different stable states depending on its development.
The authors compare prototypical autism with some relatively stable minority human variants, such as left-handedness or certain developmental variants, and propose that some forms of autism may be understood as an alternative developmental organisation rather than as a progressive disease or a simple accumulation of deficits.
This proposal is very recent. It is intellectually important because it moves autism toward a theory of developmental variants, but it remains to be tested extensively. It does not constitute a consensus.
A.3 — Perception, prediction, learning, categorisation and rationality
A.3.1 — Weak central coherence: another theoretical tradition
Before Mottron’s models, Uta Frith and Francesca Happé had developed the theory of “weak central coherence”.
In its earlier form, it suggested that autistic people had a weaker tendency to spontaneously integrate local information into a global or contextual meaning.
The theory was subsequently reformulated to speak more in terms of cognitive style or processing bias than of an obligatory deficit: stronger local processing can provide advantages in some tasks, while global-processing ability may be present but less spontaneously prioritised.
This historical development is instructive: the same experimental observation can first be interpreted as a lack of integration and later as a preference for, or autonomy of, local processing.
Mottron’s EPF model emerged partly in opposition to the deficit interpretation of weak central coherence, although the two traditions sometimes describe neighbouring experimental phenomena.
A.3.2 — Pellicano and Burr: “when the world becomes too real”
In 2012, Elizabeth Pellicano and David Burr applied Bayesian models of perception to autism.
Source: Pellicano E, Burr D. When the world becomes ‘too real’: a Bayesian explanation of autistic perception. Trends Cogn Sci. 2012;16:504–510. PMID 22959875.
In a simplified Bayesian framework, perception depends on combining two sources:
- current sensory evidence;
- “priors”, meaning expectations constructed from previous experience.
Pellicano and Burr proposed that priors might be weighted less strongly in autistic people. If sensory input is corrected less, or drawn less toward prior expectations, perception may sometimes remain closer to what is currently present.
They used a formulation that became well known: the world might become “too real” because perception would be less modulated by what is expected.
This idea is highly influential, but it was originally a theoretical hypothesis rather than a general demonstration.
A.3.3 — Predictive coding and other Bayesian models
After 2012, several variants of the model were proposed.
Some focus not on consistently weaker priors but on the precision assigned to sensory signals.
Others propose prediction errors that are weighted too strongly.
Still others emphasise difficulty estimating contextual volatility: if the world appears difficult to predict, the system may place less confidence in learned regularities.
These models are related but not identical. It is therefore incorrect to speak of a single “Bayesian theory of autism”.
A.3.4 — What do Bayesian data show in 2026?
A comprehensive review published in 2023 examined 83 studies conducted during the ten years following Pellicano and Burr’s article. The findings were highly mixed: a slight majority found no difference in the integration of priors, and studies were often underpowered or methodologically heterogeneous. Differences appeared more often for priors learned during the experiment than for previously established prior knowledge.
Source: Angeletos Chrysaitis N, Seriès P. 10 years of Bayesian theories of autism: A comprehensive review. Neurosci Biobehav Rev. 2023;145:105022. PMID 36581168.
A meta-analysis published in 2026 synthesised 23 studies and found a small-to-moderate average effect in the direction predicted by the “simple Bayesian model” (Hedges’ g ≈ 0.37), but with substantial heterogeneity not explained by the moderators examined. The authors conclude that support for a simple and universal model is limited and recommend more sophisticated hierarchical models.
Source: Cui K et al. A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis of Empirical Evidence for the Simple Bayesian Model of Autism. Neuropsychol Rev. 2026;36:184–195. PMID 40576893. DOI 10.1007/s11065-025-09672-8.
A neuroimaging meta-analysis published in September 2026 also examines prediction and prediction-error networks in autism. Its existence confirms that this question remains an active area of research; it does not, however, turn predictive-coding hypotheses into a single explanation of autism.
Source: Prediction and Prediction Error in Autism: A Meta-Analysis of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Results. Biological Psychiatry Global Open Science. September 2026;6(5):100760. DOI 10.1016/j.bpsgos.2026.100760.
The current picture is therefore nuanced:
- there is evidence compatible with a different weighting between expectations and sensory signals;
- the effect is neither universal nor homogeneous enough to summarise all autism;
- learning regularities and the precision of predictions may be more important than the simplistic idea of “weak priors”.
A.3.5 — Statistical learning and regularities
Statistical learning is the ability to extract probabilistic regularities from the environment.
A systematic review published at the end of 2025 re-examined this field in autism. The results again show a complex picture: depending on task type, modality, and the explicit or implicit nature of learning, differences are not uniform.
Source: Bell RR et al. A systematic review of statistical learning in autism spectrum disorder. Molecular Autism. 2026;17:2. Published 24 December 2025.
This is important because a person may have an excellent ability to detect some structured regularities while using certain contextual or social probabilities differently.
A.3.6 — Categorisation and category learning
A 2024 meta-analysis brought together 50 studies, with more than 1,200 autistic participants and 1,400 non-autistic participants. On average, it found lower performance among autistic participants in experimental category-learning tasks, with a medium effect size and high heterogeneity.
Source: Wimmer L et al. Category learning in autistic individuals: A meta-analysis. Psychon Bull Rev. 2024;31:460–483. PMID 37673843.
This result should not be overinterpreted.
A “category-learning task” is a specific experimental paradigm. It may depend on abstraction of a prototype, explicit rules, probabilities or other strategies.
The result therefore does not, by itself, justify saying that autistic people “cannot generalise” or “do not understand categories”.
Rather, it raises more precise questions:
- what information is used to form a category;
- how much within-category difference is tolerated;
- how much weight is given to the prototype relative to exemplars;
- which strategies are favoured;
- under what conditions a generalisation is considered relevant.
A.3.7 — “Enhanced rationality”
Several decision-making studies have produced a result opposite to exclusively deficit-based descriptions: some classic decision biases appear less strongly in autistic participants.
In 2008, De Martino and colleagues found lower sensitivity to certain framing effects.
Source: De Martino B et al. Explaining enhanced logical consistency during decision making in autism. J Neurosci. 2008. PMID 18923049.
In 2017, Farmer and colleagues found greater consistency of choices in the face of some manipulations involving decoy alternatives (“decoy effect”).
Source: Farmer GD et al. People With Autism Spectrum Conditions Make More Consistent Decisions. Psychol Sci. 2017. PMID 28635378.
A 2021 review grouped several findings under the expression “enhanced rationality”.
Source: Rozenkrantz L et al. Enhanced rationality in autism spectrum disorder. Trends Cogn Sci. 2021. PMID 34226128.
The expression should be used cautiously. It does not mean that autistic people are globally more rational, more logical or free from bias.
It means that, in certain specific tasks, several contextual biases that usually affect decision-making may have a weaker effect.
Whether this results from weaker contextual influence, more deliberative processing, emotional differences, different perception of the options or other mechanisms remains debated.
A.3.8 — Sensory perception: neither simple “hypersensitivity” nor simple superiority
Sensory characteristics are now incorporated into diagnostic criteria. They include hyperreactivity, hyporeactivity and sensory seeking.
The scientific literature shows average differences across several domains, but there is no single autistic sensory profile.
The 2026 EEG/MEG meta-analysis already mentioned included 145 studies. It found longer latencies for some early components but no robust overall amplitude differences, with substantial heterogeneity.
Source: Ghosh A et al. Neurophysiological alterations during sensory processing in autism — a meta-analysis. Eur Child Adolesc Psychiatry. 2026;35:767–784. DOI 10.1007/s00787-025-02917-0.
These data are incompatible with two opposite simplifications:
- “the autistic person simply receives too much information”;
- “the autistic person simply has superior senses”.
The phenomena appear to depend on stimulus type, processing level, response timing, language, age, co-occurring conditions and strategies.
A.4 — Social communication and double empathy
A.4.1 — The “double empathy problem”
Damian Milton proposed the “double empathy problem” in 2012.
The theory challenges the idea that difficulties in social understanding between autistic and non-autistic people are entirely caused by an autistic deficit in empathy or theory of mind.
It proposes that some misunderstandings are relational and bidirectional: two people with very different experiences, conventions and communication styles may have reciprocal difficulty understanding one another.
This proposal stimulated experimental research. Studies show that non-autistic people may also be less accurate in inferring the states or intentions of autistic people, or may evaluate autistic behaviours negatively.
Sources: Mitchell P, Sheppard E, Cassidy S. Autism and the double empathy problem: Implications for development and mental health. Br J Dev Psychol. 2021. PMID 33393101. ; Cheang RTS et al. Do you feel me? Autism, empathic accuracy and the double empathy problem. Autism. 2024. PMID 38757626.
A 2024 study of empathic accuracy produced evidence compatible with this approach.
Source: Cheang RTS et al. Do you feel me? Autism, empathic accuracy and the double empathy problem. Autism. 2024. PMID 38757626.
The literature is still developing, however. The double empathy problem does not yet have a single mechanistic theory capable of predicting every interaction. Some reviews emphasise that the concept is promising but still insufficiently defined to explain all social difficulties by itself.
Source: Autism — the problem of double empathy. Review. PMID 41696836.
Source: Mitchell P, Sheppard E, Cassidy S. Autism and the double empathy problem: Implications for development and mental health. Br J Dev Psychol. 2021. PMID 33393101.
A.5 — Neurodiversity and disability
A.5.1 — Neurodiversity: origins
The neurodiversity movement and concept took shape in neurodivergent self-advocacy communities, particularly autistic communities, during the 1990s.
They were long attributed mainly to Judy Singer, but recent historical work has shown a more collective genesis. A 2024 article emphasises that the notions of “neurological diversity” and later “neurodiversity” were developed collectively by several people from these communities.
Source: Botha M et al. The neurodiversity concept was developed collectively: An overdue correction on the origins of neurodiversity theory. Autism. 2024;28:1591–1594. PMID 38470140.
The word subsequently spread far beyond autistic circles and into universities, companies, human-resources policies, education, mental health, autism services and public debate.
A.5.2 — Three meanings not to confuse: neurodiversity, paradigm and neurodivergence
First meaning: neurodiversity as a descriptive fact. A human population displays diversity in neurocognitive functioning.
Second meaning: the neurodiversity paradigm. It adds a normative position: a neurological or cognitive difference should not automatically be equated with a pathology to be eliminated; the person’s abilities, environment, quality of life, preferences and rights should be examined.
Third meaning: “neurodivergent”. This term is used for a person whose functioning is regarded as different from the so-called neurotypical norm.
The boundaries of this third meaning are much less stable. Depending on authors and communities, “neurodivergent” may include autism, ADHD, dyslexia, dyspraxia, dyscalculia, Tourette syndrome, and sometimes psychiatric, acquired or much broader conditions.
This extension makes the term useful as a social coalition but much less precise as a scientific category.
A.5.3 — Neurodiversity and disability
Historically, the neurodiversity movement is not simply a denial of disability. A substantial proportion of its authors and activists also identify with the social or relational model of disability and the disability rights movement.
However, the relationship between neurodiversity and disability remains contested.
Several positions coexist:
- some people regard their difference as a disability;
- others say they are disabled mainly by the environment;
- others personally reject the identity of a disabled person;
- others emphasise the combination of a valued difference and real limitations;
- some families or people with very substantial needs criticise discourses they consider too centred on forms of autism compatible with a high degree of autonomy.
The 2024 humanities literature specifically highlights the political issues involved in using neurological language as a basis for identity, rights or access to resources.
Source: Jones EK, Orchard V. Neurodiversity and disability: what is at stake? Med Humanit. 2024;50:456–465. PMID 38360797.
A.5.4 — Critiques of the “neuro-”
Several authors have criticised the way the prefix “neuro-” can appear more objective than it really is.
One criticism is neurocentrism: explaining complex human phenomena mainly through the brain can erase social, developmental, cultural and relational dimensions.
Another concerns epistemic injustice: people directly concerned may be excluded from defining their own experience; conversely, some identity-based discourses can also become norms that delegitimise people with different experiences of the same condition.
Gauld, Jurek and Fourneret therefore proposed in 2024 thinking more broadly in terms of “biopsychosocial diversity”, in order to avoid both overmedicalisation and undermedicalisation.
Source: Gauld C, Jurek L, Fourneret P. Diversity, epistemic injustice and medicalization. Cortex. 2024;176:234–236. PMID 38580533.
Other authors have analysed the way the “neuro” can be co-opted both by neuroscience and by identity movements.
Source: Co-opting the “neuro” in neurodiversity and the complexities of epistemic injustice. Cortex. 2023. PMID 37837731.
A.6 — “Profound autism”, support needs and clinical differentiations
A.6.1 — “Profound autism”: where does the term come from?
The 2021 Lancet Commission proposed the administrative or descriptive term “profound autism” to draw greater attention in research and public policy to autistic people requiring very substantial and long-term assistance.
The initial problem was that the category did not have a uniformly applied definition.
Studies could use different IQ thresholds, different language criteria or different autonomy criteria, making comparisons difficult.
A.6.2 — 2026 research definition
In June 2026, Siegel, Lord, Tager-Flusberg and colleagues published the results of a Delphi process aimed at a common research definition.
Source: Siegel M et al. Developing a consensus research definition for profound autism using a modified Delphi method. Mol Autism. 2026;17:28. PMID 42380932. DOI 10.1186/s13229-026-00727-y.
The proposed definition requires:
- an ASD diagnosis;
- an age of at least 8 years;
- adaptive functioning far below the expected level, with inability to carry out most activities of daily living independently;
- adult supervision required to preserve health, safety and well-being;
- and either an IQ below 50, or verbal communication limited to single words or fixed phrases used mainly for basic needs, or both. This wording reports the criteria selected by the authors of the definition; it does not constitute a general characterisation of the people concerned by this publication.
76% of participants in the final round approved the definition.
The authors themselves emphasise important limitations: participants were predominantly American, access to assessment tools is unequal, and worldwide application is difficult.
It is a research definition, not a new universal WHO diagnostic category.
A.6.3 — A needs category is not necessarily a biological category
A study published in August 2026 analysed genomic, transcriptomic and regulomic data to determine whether people classified as having “profound autism” formed a distinct molecular group.
Source: Genomic, Transcriptomic, and Regulomic Analyses Do Not Support Profound Autism as a Distinct Biological Category. 2026. PMID 42282515.
The authors found no evidence of a clear biological separation corresponding to this category.
They did, however, observe some differences in regulatory networks associated in particular with being speaking or non-speaking.
This result must be interpreted precisely.
It does not prove that “profound autism” is useless.
Nor does it prove that very substantial needs do not exist.
It indicates that the proposed clinical or functional boundary does not correspond, in these data, to a clear genetic or molecular boundary.
A category can therefore be useful for research on support needs without thereby constituting a distinct biological category.
A.6.4 — ASD, intellectual disability and differential diagnosis
An important difficulty is that some ASD diagnostic criteria describe the absence or atypical acquisition of expected developmental abilities.
In a person with substantial intellectual disability, some social and communication difficulties may also arise for general developmental reasons.
The diagnosis of ASD therefore theoretically requires that social and behavioural particularities not be explained solely by the person’s general developmental level.
The literature emphasises that this distinction can be very difficult, particularly in genetic syndromes and in people with little spoken language.
Source: Thurm A et al. State of the Field: Differentiating Intellectual Disability From Autism Spectrum Disorder. Front Psychiatry. 2019. PMID 31417436.
This difficulty probably contributes to the heterogeneity of research cohorts.
A.7 — Terminological reference points and documentary conclusion
A.7.1 — Quick guide to terms
“Syndromic autism”: an expression used in part of the literature to designate a presentation meeting ASD criteria in the context of an identifiable genetic, chromosomal or molecular syndrome; a research and clinical-genetics term.
“Non-syndromic autism”: an expression used in part of the literature when no identifiable overall syndrome is recognised; it does not mean “non-genetic”.
“Idiopathic autism”: a term used in part of the literature when no specific aetiology has been identified.
“Secondary autism”: a variable term used in some work for a presentation meeting ASD criteria associated with a condition or factor regarded as aetiologically relevant; the terminology is not fully standardised.
Essential autism / complex autism: Miles’s historical subtyping based particularly on dysmorphology and microcephaly; not official.
Enhanced Perceptual Functioning: Mottron’s model emphasising the autonomy and, in some cases, enhanced efficiency of certain perceptual processes.
Veridical mapping: a model of exact structural correspondences involved in some forms of learning and exceptional abilities.
Weak central coherence: a theory of reduced spontaneous priority given to global/contextual integration; later reformulated as a processing style.
Hypo-priors: the hypothesis that some prior expectations carry less weight in autistic perception.
Predictive processing: a family of models in which the brain generates predictions and processes errors between predictions and incoming signals.
Enhanced rationality: reduced expression of some classic biases in certain decision-making tasks.
Double empathy problem: a model according to which some autistic/non-autistic social difficulties are bidirectional and relational.
Prototypical autism: Mottron and Gagnon’s proposal of a qualitatively recognisable developmental core; unofficial and controversial.
Frank autism: a rapid clinical impression of a highly recognisable autistic presentation; a phenomenon studied empirically, but insufficient to detect all cases.
Asymmetric developmental bifurcation: a recent theory from Mottron and colleagues viewing certain human variants, potentially including prototypical autism, as alternative developmental states.
Neurodiversity: diversity in neurocognitive functioning; the term can also refer to a paradigm and a social movement.
Neurodivergent: a broad, non-diagnostic social term with variable boundaries.
Profound autism: a descriptive/research category intended for autistic people with very substantial support needs; a Delphi research definition was published in 2026; not a universal official diagnostic category.
A.7.2 — Documentary conclusion
The current state of knowledge does not provide a single theory of autism.
Rather, it provides several layers of knowledge.
Clinical classifications and assessments can identify, with reasonable but imperfect reliability, sets of characteristics and trajectories grouped under the diagnosis of ASD.
Genetic research conducted in populations diagnosed with ASD identifies substantial associations and a highly heterogeneous architecture, including common variants, rare variants and identifiable syndromes.
Neuroscientific research detects average differences in structure, function and processing timing between groups, but no single marker can currently identify an ASD diagnosis on its own.
Cognitive science identifies reproducible differences in some domains: perception, contextual processing, categorisation, prediction, decision-making, learning and communication.
Mottron’s models have played an important role in showing that some perceptual and cognitive differences are not necessarily deficits and can support enhanced abilities.
Bayesian models have provided a powerful way to formalise the relationship between sensory signals and expectations, but the 2026 data do not support a simple and universal model.
The double empathy problem has shifted part of social research from the question “what is missing in the autistic person?” to the question “what happens between two different modes of communication and experience?”.
Neurodiversity has profoundly changed ethical and social frameworks, while introducing new conceptual ambiguities when it becomes a very broad meta-category.
Finally, debates about prototypical autism and “profound autism” show two different movements: some researchers seek to narrow a research category around a developmental prototype, while others seek to distinguish people with very substantial support needs so that they do not disappear within the heterogeneity of populations grouped under the ASD diagnosis.
None of these approaches has settled the question of what the different lines of research are actually referring to when they speak of “autism” or ASD.
As of September 2026, clinical classifications group highly heterogeneous populations under the diagnosis of ASD. Research on these populations identifies complex genetic and biological associations, as well as various perceptual, cognitive, developmental and interactional particularities, but no single theory or mechanism currently accounts for all the phenomena studied under this diagnostic category.